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Abstract:   Many public policy debates can be characterized as disagreements among 
multiple stakeholders about the selection of a public good that has multiple attributes. 
A common method for resolving such disputes is collaborative decision-making, in 
which representatives of interest groups negotiate new policies “in the shadow” of 
government-imposed backstop policies. Although this technique is widely used, little 
is known about the nature of the policies that it generates. The purpose of this paper is 
to identify several hypotheses about collaborative decision-making using the 
Edgeworth box framework, and to test these hypotheses using laboratory experiments. 
Specifically, we investigate the predictive success of three theories of negotiator 
motivation: utilitarian (attraction to the Nash bargain), egalitarian (equalization of the 
parties’ payoffs), and historical entitlement (maintenance of the status quo, or 
“historical” distribution of payoffs). Using a full information, face-to-face bargaining 
design, we find that parties successfully reach approximately Pareto efficient 
agreements.  When the Nash bargain differs from the  efficient outcome at which 
payoffs are equalized, our subjects are drawn partially towards the latter. When the 
historical entitlement is also egalitarian, the parties are drawn even further from the 
Nash toward the efficient equal payoff outcome. Thus, although both utility-
maximization and entitlement affect which Pareto efficient outcome is reached, 
equality is the dominant motivating factor. 
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Utilitarian, Egalitarian, and Historical Entitlement Theories 
of Collaborative Bargaining: An Experimental Test 
 
1 Introduction 
Many public policy debates can be characterized as disagreements among multiple 
stakeholders about the selection of a public good that has multiple attributes. In 
environmental policy-making for example, environmentalists, developers, and 
recreational users might be in conflict not only over the number of acres of public 
land that are to be set aside to protect endangered species, but also over the degree to 
which hotels, ski hills, and mining companies will be given access to that land. 
Similarly, disputes about education provision may be concerned not only with the 
determination of the number of schools to be built in a district, but also with the 
development of curriculum, the selection of the pupil-teacher ratio, and the provision 
of computer laboratories.  
  Traditionally, the necessary trade-offs among the various attributes of 
government policy have been made by government agents – either elected officials or 
their delegated employees – often after consultation with the affected parties. 
Recently, however, interest has been expressed in an alternative process that is known 
variously as collaborative decision-making, negotiated rulemaking, deliberative 
democracy, and consensus-building.
1 In most of these approaches, the government 
                                                 
1 Some of the more important contributions to this literature include Aengst et. al. 
(1997), Amy (1985), Coglianese (1997), Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990), Harter 
(1982), Pritzker and Dalton (1995), and Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000). 
 
  2invites representatives from all interested groups to collaborate in person on the 
development of a new policy. If a consensus is reached among them, the government 
implements the selected policy; if no consensus is reached, the government 
implements a “backstop” policy. In some cases the latter is simply a continuation of 
the existing, or historical policy; in others it is the introduction of a new policy that 
has been announced by the government. 
  Although collaborative decision-making has been extensively discussed by 
scholars of public administration, political science, environmental design, and 
sociology, among others, economists have been slow to analyze either the efficiency 
or the equity of this approach. In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to provide 
some of the first tests of economic theory concerning these factors. Specifically, we 
employ an Edgeworth box framework to investigate whether two parties, with 
conflicting payoff functions over two goods (the attributes of a public policy), are able 
to reach consensus on the allocation of those goods, and to identify what the 
characteristics of such a consensus will be. 
  Our benchmark hypothesis, based on axiomatic bargaining theory, is that if 
subjects are utilitarian, they will select the Nash bargain – the outcome that 
maximizes the products of their gains relative to the backstop position.
2 However, we 
also consider two alternative hypotheses that have been proposed in the bargaining 
literature. First, we investigate the possibility that subjects are egalitarian, favoring 
efficient outcomes that equalize their payoffs even when that means deviating from 
                                                 
2 Note: The prediction that the parties will select the Nash bargain also implies (i) that 
the parties will reach an agreement; and (ii) that any outcome they choose will be both 
Pareto superior to the backstop and Pareto efficient. As those hypotheses were tested 
extensively by Bruce and Clark (2008), they are not the focus of this paper. 
  3the Nash bargain. Second, we test the hypothesis that bargainers’ perceptions of the 
“fairness” of the backstop might be influenced by their relative allocations at the 
status quo – their historical entitlement. In that case, if the backstop chosen by the 
government differs from the historical policy, the parties might be drawn away from 
the Nash bargain towards an efficient outcome that reflects the parties’ historical 
relationship. Importantly, if the latter were to occur, the government’s ability to move 
public policy away from the status quo using collaborative bargaining would be 
restricted. 
  We employ four experimental treatments. In Treatment I, the parties’ payoffs 
are equal at the Nash bargain and the government announces that if the parties fail to 
reach agreement, the status quo will be maintained; (that is, the historical position is 
also the backstop). In Treatment II, we leave the backstop position and equal payoff 
Nash bargain unchanged, but begin with a historical policy that has unequal payoffs. 
In Treatment III, we again align the historical position with the backstop, but choose a 
payoff structure such that the parties’ payoffs are unequal at the Nash bargain – 
thereby separating the latter from the efficient outcome that equalizes payoffs. 
Finally, in Treatment IV, we maintain the backstop and unequal Nash bargain from 
Treatment III, but begin with a more equal historical position.  
  Our experimental results provide only limited support for the utilitarian 
hypothesis.  Although the parties agree to the Nash bargain when it equalizes payoffs; 
they are drawn from the former towards the latter when the two diverge.  Conversely, 
strong support is provided for the egalitarian hypothesis: in each of the four 
treatments, our subjects appear to be drawn towards the efficient equal payoff 
outcome, even when the latter is Pareto inferior to the backstop. Finally, we find 
mixed support for the historical entitlement hypothesis.  The historical position has no 
  4discernible effect on the outcomes chosen by our subjects when it provides a less 
equal allocation of payoffs than the backstop, but it increases the equality of 
agreement payoffs when it provides a more equal allocation. 
  The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. In Section 2, we use 
the Edgeworth box model to describe the nature of the bargaining problem under 
collaborative decision-making; and we summarise those elements of the existing 
literature that provide utilitarian, egalitarian and historical entitlement predictions 
concerning negotiation outcomes.  In Section 3, we describe the design of a laboratory 
experiment used to test the conflicting predictions of the three hypotheses on 
collaborative decision-making.  In Section 4 we present our results.  Section 5 
concludes the paper with a discussion of the implications of our findings. 
   
2  Modeling Collaborative Decision-Making  
The most widely reported applications of collaborative bargaining have occurred in 
the environmental sector
3, where stakeholder groups have been employed: to develop 
habitat conservation plans to protect endangered species (Thomas, 2001; Anderson 
and Yaffee, 1998), zone large tracts of public lands (Bruce, 2006), and develop air 
and water pollution regulations (Pritzker and Dalton, 1995). But this approach has 
also been applied to many non-environmental questions. The Negotiated Rulemaking 
Act in the United States, for example, encourages agencies to employ a process in 
which the groups that would be affected by a proposed regulation are given the 
opportunity to develop a consensus-based alternative to that regulation. This 
technique has been used, for example, to develop rules for financial assistance, to 
                                                 
3 See footnote 1. 
 
  5negotiate regulations concerning workplace safety, and to revise the rules concerning 
flight times for airline pilots. (Pritzker and Dalton, 1995). Fung and Wright (2001) 
have argued that many other collaborative processes, including parent-directed school 
councils and some forms of community-based policing meetings, also satisfy their 
definition of “empowered deliberative democracy.” And political scientists have 
argued that many types of international negotiations (for example, over the GATT), 
resemble collaborative bargaining with the status quo as the backstop. (See Steinberg, 
2002.) 
  To model this approach, we develop an example of two interest groups, 
denoted environmentalists (Env) and developers (Dev), in conflict over two 
dimensions of resource policy: the amount of public land to be protected, A, in acres, 
and the severity of restrictions to be placed on commercial activity on that land, R. 
Relative to the current, or historical, allocation, H, environmentalists would prefer 
more of both A and R, while developers would prefer less of both. We illustrate these 
assumptions in Figure 1 using a conventional Edgeworth box.   
  In order to resolve this conflict, the government offers to allow the parties to 
negotiate a revised allocation of resources. In the first of two alternative scenarios, we 
assume that the government announces that if negotiations succeed, it will implement 
the policy selected by the parties; whereas if negotiations fail, it will leave in place the 
historical policy. That is, the backstop, B, is set equal to H.
4  In this circumstance, it 
has been argued that utility-maximizing negotiators will select the Nash bargain 
(Nash 1950) - the outcome that maximizes the product of their gains relative to the 
backstop. (See for  
                                                 
4 In the literature on policy-making, the backstop is sometimes referred to as the 
BATNA, or “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (Fisher and Ury, 1991).   
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Fig. 1:  An Edgeworth Box Representation of Collaborative Decision-making 
 
example, Nydegger and Owen, 1975; and Roth and Malouf, 1979.)  Following 
Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), we refer to this as the utilitarian hypothesis. As the Nash 
bargain, N, 
must be both Pareto superior to H and Pareto efficient, we place N on the contract 
curve, within the bargaining lens formed around B=H, in Figure 1.  
  In a second scenario, the government announces that it proposes to introduce a 
policy that differs from H; but offers interest groups the option of negotiating an 
alternative outcome, which it promises to implement.
5 In this case, the policy 
 
5 This is the effect of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act in the United States. (Pritzker 
and Dalton, 1995.) 
  7proposed by the government becomes the backstop, B, and the Nash bargain is 
defined relative to this. Now, as indicated in Figure 2, H lies outside the bargaining 
lens formed around B.  
  Although our benchmark hypothesis is that the parties will select the Nash 
bargain, we also test two other hypotheses that have been proposed in the 
experimental economics literature.  In the first of these, a number of authors - notably, 
Nydegger and Owen (1975), Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan (1981) and Hoffman and 
Spitzer (1985), and Shogren (1997) - have tested the conjecture that negotiators 
behave as if they are egalitarians. With the exception of Shogren, they found that 
their subjects were drawn towards outcomes within the efficient set that offered them 
equal payoffs.
6 One such outcome has been identified as E in Figure 2. 
  In a second line of research, it has been argued that the relative bargaining 
power of two negotiators may be influenced by their relative perceptions of 
“entitlement” to the positions they have taken. In particular, a party which believed 
that its initial position was “fair” or “deserved” might press more vigorously for 
maintenance of that position than would a party that did not hold such a belief. Within 
the experimental literature, this line of argument has taken two forms: the earned 
entitlement and historical entitlement approaches. 
  The earned entitlement approach follows Buchanan (1986) in arguing that 
individuals will hold more firmly to their positions if they had expended effort to 
obtain  
                                                 
6 Note: the experimental literature has found the outcomes chosen to be efficient in 
the sense that they lay on the contract curve; not in the sense that they were Pareto 
superior to the backstop. 
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Fig. 2 Edgeworth Box with unequal Nash and Backstop unequal to Historical 
Entitlement   
 
those positions. A number of experiments – notably Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), 
Burrows and Loomes (1994), and Gachter and Riedl (2005) – have tested this 
hypothesis by comparing two sets of negotiations: one in which subjects were 
randomly assigned unequal initial allocations of resources, and one in which one of 
the subjects “earned” a preferred initial allocation by winning a simple game. The 
findings of these studies were consistent with the earned entitlement hypothesis.  
Subjects who had earned their initial allocations were less likely to negotiate equal 
divisions of resources than were those who had obtained their initial allocations 
through random assignment. 
  9  In the historical entitlement approach, it is argued that individuals will 
consider themselves to be entitled to the initial, or “historical” allocation of resources 
(i) if they had obtained that allocation without the use of threat, fraud, or force 
(Nozick, 1974; and Zajac, 1995); or (ii) if a “moral authority” had told them that their 
“….entitlements are rights.” (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985: 266). Both Hoffman and 
Spitzer (1985) and Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan (1981) have found experimental 
evidence to support this hypothesis.  
For the purposes of this paper, we focus on historical entitlements. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that when the backstop chosen by the government differs 
from the historical position – that is, when it sets a backstop, B, that differs from H, as 
in Figure 2 – negotiators will be drawn away from efficient allocations within the lens 
conditioned on B, to those within the lens conditioned on H. To the extent that parties 
do not condition their negotiations on B, collaborative bargaining will restrict a 
government’s ability to shift policy away from the status quo.  
To summarise, we propose to test three alternative hypotheses concerning the 
outcomes that negotiators will obtain in collaborative bargaining: 
•  Utilitarian: The parties will negotiate to the Nash bargain, N – defined 
relative to the backstop position B announced by the government. 
•  Egalitarian: The parties will be drawn towards the efficient outcome at 
which payoffs are equalized, E. This outcome need not be Pareto superior to the 
backstop. 
•  Historical entitlement: The parties will be drawn towards efficient 
outcomes within the bargaining lens conditioned on H, rather than those 
conditioned on B. Again, this outcome need not be Pareto superior to the 
backstop. 
  10 
3 Experimental  Design   
3.1  Design Features Across All Treatments 
To implement bilateral bargaining over two dimensions of policy, we recruited 
subjects in groups of 10, and gave each an induced value payoff function over two 
abstract goods, X and Y.  Five subjects were assigned one payoff function, and five 
another, based on their prior choice of seat in the room.  For exposition, we refer to 
the two preference types induced by these payoff functions as environmentalists and 
developers, though the neutral labels “you” and “the other person” were used in the 
experiment.  To generate convex indifference curves for each type over the two 
goods, we used Cobb Douglas payoff functions: 
  
          ( 1 )  
1
Env Env Env Env Env Pa X Y b
αα − =+
           
 
1
Dev Dev Dev Dev Dev Pa X Y b
αα − =+         .       (2) 
 
 
The use of a common exponent,α , for both types implied that the contract curve was 
a diagonal line.  The use of constant returns to scale ensured that total payoffs would 
be constant along the contract curve, thus controlling for joint payoff efficiency.  Each 
type of individual, i, was endowed with a historical allocation of Xi,H  and Yi,H.  We set 
the total quantity of X and Y each at 20 units, thereby creating 400 potential 
combinations, in order to minimize the possibility that we would inadvertently create 
focal points. (See Schelling, 1960.)  Across all treatments, we set a non-symmetric 
backstop outcome at (XEnv,B, YEnv,B) = (18, 7) and (XDev,B, YDev,B) = (2, 13), or for 
brevity, (18,7)/(2,13).  This resulted in the portion of the contract curve within the 
  11bargaining lens being located between (XEnv, YEnv) = (12, 12) and (XEnv, YEnv) = (14, 
14). 
Because risk preference is thought to influence bargaining outcomes 
(Murnighan et al. 1988), subjects’ risk attitudes were elicited prior to the bargaining 
instructions using the method of Holt and Laury (2002).
7 
After reading instructions and studying their own payoff tables (and those of 
their opponents) for as long as any individual wanted, subjects were then placed 
together in pairs, one environmentalist with one developer.  They were then allowed a 
three minute period of unstructured communication in which they could discuss 
mutually acceptable allocations of X and Y.  To be accepted as valid, negotiated 
outcomes had to be technically feasible, or 
                        ( 3 )   ,, 20 Env Dev Env B Dev B XXX X +≤ + =
          
               ( 4 )   ,, 20 Env Dev Env B Dev B YYY Y +≤ + =
To register a negotiated outcome other than the backstop, one of the bargaining pair 
had to describe the allocation on a form, and the other had to tick a box signifying 
agreement. 
To control for the effects of accumulating income on risk preference, only one 
of the five rounds was implemented at the end of experiment, chosen by the throw of 
a die.  We prevented subjects from being able to make credible offers of cash side 
                                                 
7   The pair average of risk aversion as measured by this instrument was not significant 
in random effects panel regressions predicting whether agreements were a) in the 
bargaining lens, b) Pareto efficient, or c) at the Nash bargain.  Neither were most pair 
demographic characteristics we elicited.  For brevity, we exclude these results in what 
follows.   
  12payments after the experiment by (i) ensuring that total earnings were constant along 
the contract curve, and (ii) using a different privately held random draw for each 
person when being paid to determine which round to count. 
Our mixing protocol over the five rounds resulted in each member of one type 
being paired serially with all five members of the other type.  The experiment was 
conducted manually.  Logistically, during the risk elicitation phase, the ten subjects 
per session were seated at widely spaced individual tables in two rows, with an empty 
row in between adjacent to the back row.  During the bargaining phase, the front row 
of subjects (all of one type) was turned around and seated at empty tables across from 
their first set of opponents.  There were thus two tables separating each member of the 
bargaining pair.  In subsequent rounds the two types alternated in having to switch 
one table to the right.  Our design is unusual in that subjects were allowed full, 
unrestricted communication with their opponents during each three minute round.  
They were warned that threatening or abusive language would not be tolerated, and 
each pair’s conversation was recorded with a micro-cassette player located midway 
between them to one side of the tables.  While the unstructured, face to face 
communication introduced “uncontrolled aspects of social interaction” (Roth 1995), it 
also paralleled the in-person, unstructured negotiation used in collaborative decision 
making.    
 
3.2  Design Features of Each Treatment 
We ran four treatments, varying the location of the historical entitlement and the 
inequality of the Nash bargain in a 2x2 design.  Sessions were run so as to 
systematically alternate through the four treatments.  Returning to our payoff 
  13functions (1) and (2), in all treatments we chose the a’s, b’s and α  in such a way as to 
keep constant the following: 
1.  the size of the Edgeworth Box:  20 Env Dev XX + =  and     20 Env Dev YY +=
2.  the size of the bargaining lens (55 cells) 
2.  the backstop allocation B: (XEnvB, YEnvB) = (18, 5) and (XDevB, YDevB)= (2,15). 
3. the allocation at the Nash bargain, N:  (XEnvN, YEnvN) = (13, 13) and (XDevN, 
YDevN)= (7,7) 
4.  the sum of backstop values:  + 
1 18 7 Env Env ab
αα − +
1 21 3 Dev Dev a
αα − +b = $28.77. 
5.  the sum of all contract curve values, including the Nash bargain:  
      +
1 13 13 Env Env ab
αα − +
1 77 Dev Dev a
αα − +b
                                                
= $45.50. 
In addition, we set the parameters to ensure that the value of the total payoffs was 
substantially higher along the contract curve (including at N or E) than at H or B.   
  To simplify the presentation of payoffs, subjects were provided two colored 
payoff tables showing the specific earnings they and their opponent would receive for 
all feasible combinations of X and Y.
8  The parameters for all four treatments are 
reported in Table 1; the payoff tables presented to the Environmentalists for 
Treatment II are reproduced in Figure 3.  In treatments where H and B were identical, 
 
8 Allocations that yield negative earnings for either party were excluded from 
consideration, yielding 199 possible allocations in Treatments I and II, and 215 
allocations in Treatments III and IV.  Subjects were given a considerable time to 
study both payoff tables and a session did not proceed until every subject indicated 
that he or she had finished looking at the tables.  Calculators were provided for each 
person.   
  14they were identified on a payoff table as a single yellow cell.  In treatments where 
they differed, H and B were identified by green and red cells, respectively.  
Treatment I 
Treatment I is our control treatment, with no divergence between the initial allocation 
H, from which subjects began their negotiations, and the backstop allocation B that 
would be imposed if they could not reach agreement ((18,7)/(2,13)).  The payoffs for 
the environmentalist and developer at B were approximately equal, at $14.67 and 
$14.10, respectively.  In Treatment I the Nash bargain N coincided with the unique 
allocation E on the contract curve that equalized final earnings between the 
environmentalist and developer at (13,13)/(7,7), with respective payoffs of $22.75 
each. Treatment I is approximated by Figure 1 in design and the first panel of Figure 4 
in results.  In this treatment the utilitarian and egalitarian hypotheses both predict that 
the parties will bargain within the single bargaining lens created by B to a Pareto 
efficient allocation on the contract curve at N. Since H=B, the historical entitlement 
hypothesis predicts only that the parties will settle on the contract curve within the 
lens. Thus, the models set out in Section 2 provide similar predictions concerning the 
outcome of negotiations in Treatment I.  
Treatment II 
In Treatment II, we wished to separate the historical allocation H that subjects were 
given at the start of a round from the backstop position, B. We did this by setting the 
  15Table 1:  Parameters Used Across Treatments 
Treatment I:  (Historical = Backstop Allocation, Nash Bargain Equalizes 
Payoffs) 
 
  Environmentalist    Developer 
 
Payoff 
Function:         
1/2 1/2 ( , ) 4.55 36.40 Env UX Y X Y =−
1/2 1/2 ( , ) 4.55 9.10 Dev UX Y X Y =−
 
At H & B:  Gets $14.67 from (18,7)     Gets $14.10 from (2,13) 
At N & E:  Gets $22.75 from (13,13)    Gets $22.75 from (7,7) 
 
 
Treatment II: (Historical ≠ Backstop Allocation, Nash Bargain Equalizes 
Payoffs)  
 
  Environmentalist    Developer 
 
Payoff 
Function:  See Treatment I      See Treatment I 
 
At H:    Gets $  0.00 from (16,4)     Gets $27.30 from (4,16) 
At B:    Gets $14.67 from (18,7)     Gets $14.10 from (2,13) 
At N & E:  Gets $22.75 from (13,13)    Gets $22.75 from (7,7) 
 
 
Treatment III: (Historical = Backstop, Nash Bargain Does Not Equalize Payoffs)  
 
  Environmentalist    Developer 
 
Payoff        
 
1/2 1/2 ( , ) 4.55 22.75 Env UX Y X Y =−
1/2 1/2 .55 22.75 X Y =− ( , ) 4 Dev UX Y
 
At H & B:  Gets $28.32 from (18,7)     Gets $  0.45 from (2,13) 
At N:    Gets $36.40 from (13,13)    Gets $  9.10 from (7,7) 
At E:    Gets $22.75 from (10,10)    Gets $22.75 from (10,10) 
 
 
Treatment IV: (Historical ≠ Backstop, Nash Bargain Does Not Equalize Payoffs)   
 
  Environmentalist    Developer 
 
Payoff 
Function:  See Treatment III      See Treatment III 
 
At H:    Gets $13.65 from (16,4)     Gets $13.65 from (4,16) 
At B:    Gets $28.32 from (18,7)     Gets $  0.45 from (2,13) 
At N:    Gets $36.40 from (13,13)    Gets $  9.10 from (7,7) 
At E:    Gets $22.75 from (10,10)    Gets $22.75 from (10,10) 
  16Figure 3  Payoff Tables Given to an Environmentalist in Treatment II
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          ID _______
      PART II:  YOUR DOLLAR EARNINGS FROM YOUR FINAL HOLDINGS OF X AND Y
20
19 3.27 7.95 12.18 16.07 19.70 23.10 26.32 29.38 32.30 35.11 37.81 40.41 42.93
18 2.21 6.77 10.88 14.67 18.20 21.51 24.64 27.62 30.47 33.20 35.83 38.36 40.82 43.19 45.50
17 1.12 5.55 9.55 13.23 16.66 19.88 22.92 25.82 28.59 31.24 33.79 36.26 38.64 40.95 43.19
16 0.00 4.30 8.18 11.75 15.08 18.20 21.15 23.96 26.65 29.22 31.70 34.09 36.40 38.64 40.82 42.93
15 3.00 6.77 10.22 13.44 16.47 19.33 22.05 24.64 27.14 29.54 31.85 34.09 36.26 38.36 40.41
YOUR  14 1.67 5.30 8.64 11.75 14.67 17.44 20.06 22.57 24.98 27.30 29.54 31.70 33.79 35.83 37.81
13 0.28 3.78 7.00 10.00 12.82 15.48 18.01 20.43 22.75 24.98 27.14 29.22 31.24 33.20 35.11
FINAL  12 2.21 5.30 8.18 10.88 13.44 15.88 18.20 20.43 22.57 24.64 26.65 28.59 30.47 32.30
11 0.56 3.53 6.28 8.87 11.32 13.65 15.88 18.01 20.06 22.05 23.96 25.82 27.62 29.38
HOLDINGS 10 1.67 4.30 6.77 9.10 11.32 13.44 15.48 17.44 19.33 21.15 22.92 24.64 26.32
9 2.21 4.55 6.77 8.87 10.88 12.82 14.67 16.47 18.20 19.88 21.51 23.10
OF Y  8 0.00 2.21 4.30 6.28 8.18 10.00 11.75 13.44 15.08 16.66 18.20 19.70
7 1.67 3.53 5.30 7.00 8.64 10.22 11.75 13.23 14.67 16.07
6 0.56 2.21 3.78 5.30 6.77 8.18 9.55 10.88 12.18
5 0.28 1.67 3.00 4.30 5.55 6.77 7.95





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
YOUR FINAL HOLDINGS OF X  





16 9.10 16.64 22.42 27.30
15 8.52 15.82 21.42 26.14 30.30 34.07 37.52
OTHER'S 14 7.92 14.98 20.39 24.95 28.97 32.60 35.94 39.05 41.97
13 7.31 14.10 19.31 23.71 27.58 31.08 34.30 37.30 40.12 42.78
FINAL  12 6.66 13.19 18.20 22.42 26.14 29.51 32.60 35.48 38.18 40.74 43.18 45.50
11 5.99 12.24 17.04 21.08 24.64 27.86 30.83 33.58 36.17 38.62 40.95 43.18
HOLDINGS 10 5.29 11.25 15.82 19.68 23.07 26.14 28.97 31.60 34.07 36.40 38.62 40.74 42.78
9 4.55 10.20 14.54 18.20 21.42 24.34 27.01 29.51 31.85 34.07 36.17 38.18 40.12 41.97
OF Y  8 3.77 9.10 13.19 16.64 19.68 22.42 24.95 27.30 29.51 31.60 33.58 35.48 37.30 39.05
7 2.94 7.92 11.75 14.98 17.82 20.39 22.75 24.95 27.01 28.97 30.83 32.60 34.30 35.94 37.52
6 2.05 6.66 10.20 13.19 15.82 18.20 20.39 22.42 24.34 26.14 27.86 29.51 31.08 32.60 34.07
5 1.07 5.29 8.52 11.25 13.65 15.82 17.82 19.68 21.42 23.07 24.64 26.14 27.58 28.97 30.30
4 0.00 3.77 6.66 9.10 11.25 13.19 14.98 16.64 18.20 19.68 21.08 22.42 23.71 24.95 26.14 27.30
3 2.05 4.55 6.66 8.52 10.20 11.75 13.19 14.54 15.82 17.04 18.20 19.31 20.39 21.42 22.42
2 0.00 2.05 3.77 5.29 6.66 7.92 9.10 10.20 11.25 12.24 13.19 14.10 14.98 15.82 16.64
1 0.00 1.07 2.05 2.94 3.77 4.55 5.29 5.99 6.66 7.31 7.92 8.52 9.10
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
OTHER'S FINAL HOLDINGS OF X
OTHER'S PAYOFF FUNCTION: $4.55 X
1/2 Y
1/2 - $9.10    
                                                 
9 Note that, when given to participants, these tables each took a full sheet of paper, 
and that the “Other’s” payoff table was printed on differently colored paper. 
  17environmentalists’ and developers’ initial allocations at (16,4)/(4,16), (valued at $0.00 
and $27.30 respectively), but leaving all of our other assumptions from Treatment I 
unchanged.
10 That is, the only difference between Treatments I and II was that, in the 
latter, the initial allocation now lay outside the bargaining lens - B, N and E were all 
unchanged between treatments. This separation of H from B implied: (i) that payoffs 
were divided more equally within the bargaining lens associated with B than the lens 
associated with H; and (ii) that the environmentalists were better off at every point 
within the bargaining lens associated with B than they were at H (and the developers 
worse off except for allocations where the two lenses overlapped). As in Treatment I, 
both the utilitarian and egalitarian hypotheses predict that the parties will select the 
N=E outcome within the bargaining lens formed around B. The historical entitlement 
hypothesis, however, predicts that the negotiated outcomes will move south-west 
along the contract curve to reflect at least some of the inequality favouring the 
Developer that had been present at H.  
Treatments III and IV 
Our goal in Treatments III and IV was to reproduce Treatments I and II, respectively, 
but with N separated from E. Our approach was to leave the physical locations of H, B 
and N as in the first two treatments; but to change the underlying payoff functions to 
move E. This resulted in three changes. First, the parties’ payoffs were now unequal 
at B - $28.32 and $0.45, respectively.
11 Second, with the N resulting from this B now 
                                                 
10 If this allocation had been the backstop, the Nash bargain would have occurred at 
(10,10)/(10,10), with payoffs of $9.10 and $36.40 respectively. 
11 The degree of inequality and low absolute earnings threatened for developers in 
Treatments III and IV made us concerned ex ante that some subjects might leave the 
  18also unequal at $36.40 and $9.10, respectively, E shifted south west to be outside the 
bargaining lens defined by B to (10,10)/(10,10), with payoffs of $22.75 each. Thirdly, 
in Treatment IV alone, where H diverged from the (unequal) B, the payoffs at H 
became equal at $13.65 each.  Treatment IV is approximated by Figure 2 in design 
and the fourth panel of Figure 4 in results.    
With only one exception, all of the predictions that were made with respect to 
Treatment I apply also to Treatment III – the parties are expected to negotiate an 
outcome on the contract curve, within the bargaining lens formed around B, at N.  The 
exception is that if the parties are egalitarian, they can be expected to be drawn from 
the N allocation of (13,13)/(7,7) towards the E allocation of (10,10)/(10,10).
12   
The only difference between Treatments III and IV is that in the latter we 
moved H to a position southwest of B, to the same physical location as used in 
Treatment II.  The historical entitlement hypothesis suggests that this divergence 
between H and B would result in bargained outcomes that were further southwest 
along the contract curve in Treatment IV than they had been in Treatment III. 
 
4 The  Results   
Sixteen experiment sessions with 10 subjects each were run at the University of 
Canterbury between April and May of 2008.  Four sessions were run per treatment, so 
that each treatment contained 40 people who provided 20 paired bargaining outcomes 
                                                                                                                                            
experiment early.  To our relief, this did not happen.  Our subsequent results may 
explain why. 
12 The parties are only predicted to settle exactly at E if the equity motive dominates 
all other motives. 
  19per round over five bargaining rounds.  Each bargaining outcome consisted of the 
physical allocation of X and Y between the Environmentalist and Developer, 
(XEnv,YEnv)/(XDev,YDev), and the parties’ resulting respective earnings.  Each session 
took roughly 90 minutes, and subjects earned on average NZ $24.49 (1.00NZ$ = 
0.78US$).  
  We divide our discussion of the results from the experiment as follows.  Since 
all three of our predictive models assume that subjects reach Pareto efficient 
agreements, we begin by comparing agreement rates and proximity to the contract 
curve across all treatments.  We then briefly summarize how agreed outcomes change 
across treatments, and then test whether the utilitarian, egalitarian, or historical 
entitlement hypotheses can explain the changes observed. 
4.1  Agreement rates and Proximity to the Contract Curve 
To provide intuition for the results to follow, Figure 4 illustrates all agreements and 
disagreements for our bargaining pairs for the final four rounds pooled for each of our 
four treatments.  Corresponding descriptive statistics for all five rounds are provided 
in Table 2.  As is apparent from the table, initially subjects found it easiest to reach 
agreement in Treatment I (N=E, H=B).  Here 100% of pairs agreed to a new outcome 
even in Round 1.  Round 1 agreements were almost as common in Treatment II (N=E, 
H≠B) at 85%, and in Treatment IV (N≠E, H≠B) at 80%.  The initial agreement rate 
was lowest, at 50%, in Treatment III (N≠E, H=B), where both utilitarianism and 
historical entitlement produced very unequal payoffs.  By rounds 4 and 5, however, 
agreement rates had converged to or near 100% in all treatments.  Comparison of 
mean agreement rates round by round, either for the effect of separating H from B (I 
vs. II, III vs. IV) or of separating E from N  (I vs. III, II vs. IV) found no significant 
differences in Round 2, 4 or 
  20Figure 4 Observations from Rounds 2 through 5, Treatments I through IV 
 
   
 
  
   
 
 




  21Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Physical Bargaining Outcomes 
                       Round 
        Pair N   1    2   3   4   5           Ave.  
Agreement Rates 
 
   T I:    H
 = B, E = N     20
1  1.00     .95   1.00   1.00   1.00      .99      
   T II:   H
 ≠ B, E = N     20    .85     .95     .95     .90   1.00      .93 
   T III:   H
 = B, E ≠ N     20    .50     .85     .80   1.00     .95       .82 
   T IV:   H
 ≠ B, E ≠ N     20    .80     .95   1.00   1.00   1.00      .95   
            
  
Proportion in Bargaining Lens: 
 
    T I:     H
 = B, E = N   20
1 1.00
  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00     1.00 
    T II:    H
 ≠ B, E = N    20  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00     1.00 
    T III:  H
 = B, E ≠ N    20    .70    .70    .70    .75    .70      .71 
    T IV:  H
 ≠ B, E ≠ N              20      .35    .30    .30    .30    .20      .29 
          
Contingent on Reaching Agreement: 
  
  Proportion exactly on the Contract Curve:    
 
      T I:  H
 = B, E = N      .65   1.00  1.00    .90    .95        .90
2      
      T II:  H
 ≠ B, E = N       .65    .89    .84  1.00  1.00      .88     
      T III:  H
 = B, E ≠ N       .70    .35    .25    .35    .32      .37      
      T IV:  H
 ≠ B, E ≠ N       .63    .68    .60    .60    .75         .65 
       
  Proportion exactly at the Nash Bargain (13,13)/(7,7):   
   
      T I:  H
 = B, E = N      .65  1.00  1.00    .90    .95      .90
2  
      T II:  H
 ≠ B, E = N      .59    .84    .84  1.00  1.00      .86     
      T III:  H
 = B, E ≠ N      .10    .06    .00    .05    .00      .04     
      T IV:  H
 ≠ B, E ≠ N      .00    .05    .05    .00    .05      .03     
 
  Proportion exactly at (10,10)/(10,10) (Equalizes Earnings in III, IV):   
      
      T I:  H
 = B, E = N      .00    .00    .00    .00    .00      .00
2   
      T II:  H
 ≠ B, E = N      .00    .00    .00    .00    .00      .00 
      T III:  H
 = B, E ≠ N      .40    .12    .06    .05    .00      .10 
      T IV:  H




1     N = 19 pairs for Round 5 of Treatment I, where a technically inefficient agreement is 
omitted. 
2  Average across rounds weighted by the number of agreements per round. 
  225.
13   Thus, after only a few rounds of experience, bargainers learned to reach 
agreement even in very challenging environments, as predicted under all three 
bargaining hypotheses.   
Were the agreements reached Pareto efficient?  Table 2 reports the proportion 
of agreements that were precisely on the contract curve.  We think, however, that a 
better gauge of support for Pareto efficiency can be found by measuring the physical 
or financial deviation of agreements from the contract curve.  This is because some 
(X,Y) allocations immediately adjacent to the contract curve offered bargainers 
additional options for dividing payoffs, with joint earnings that were almost as high.  
Beginning first with physical deviations, we measure the geometric distance of 
agreements to the nearest allocation on the contract curve.
14  To illustrate magnitudes, 
an agreement one or two diagonal units from the contract curve would have distance 
measures of 1.41 or 2.83 units away from it, respectively, while B (at (18,7)/(2,13)) 
would be 7.78 units away.  As reported in Table 3, we find that subjects who reach  
                                                 
,
1 / 2
13   In Round 3, two tailed t tests found that agreement rates were significantly higher 
in Treatment I than Treatment III (p value .04), and significantly higher in Treatment 
IV than in Treatment III (p value .04).  The results were similar in round 1, where 
agreements were again more likely if the Nash equalized earnings (p value .05), or if 
historical entitlements equalized earnings (p value .00).   
 
14 If the closest allocation (in geometric distance) on the contract curve is defined as 
( ), the distance of an agreement is  .  If 
an outcome was equidistant to two cells on the contract curve, distance was measured 
to the averaged coordinates.   
, , env cc env cc XY
22
,, (( ) ( ) ) env env cc env env cc XX Y Y −+ −
  23Table 3:  Geometric Distance and Difference in Joint Earnings Between 
Agreements and the Nearest Point on the Contract Curve  
 
                     Round 
Treatment           1                  2                  3         4        5 
   
I    Mean Distance     .813         0        0       .318               .112      
      St. dev.     1.262         0        0      .986                 .487      
 
      Mean Difference     .55         0        0       .26     .06 
      St. dev.          .96         0        0       .81                .25 
 




II   Mean Distance    .666     .558       .595         0       0 
      St. dev.    1.211    1.865    1.532         0       0 
 
      Mean Difference     .45       .99       .67         0       0    
      St. dev.        1.13       3.84     1.95         0       0 
 




III  Mean Distance    .283      .749      .707      .601    .707  
      St. dev.      .494      .769      .577      .770    .816 
       
      Mean Difference         .07       .26       .19       .24      .29 
      St. dev.          .15       .39       .27       .73      .75 
 
      N              10         17        16        20       19
  
 
IV  Mean Distance    .884      .484      .354       .318               .177 
      St. dev.    2.153    1.029      .487       .428    .314 
 
      Mean Difference        1.28        .30       .08        .07      .03 
      St. dev.         4.53      1.00       .14        .12      .05 
 
      N               16         19        20         20       20 
 
 
  24agreement do so close to or on the contract curve in all treatments.  Average distance 
ranged from 0.28 to 0.88 units across treatments in Round 1, and from 0 to 0.71 units 
by Round 5.   
  Perhaps more importantly from an efficiency perspective, subjects achieved 
joint earnings indistinguishably close to that available on the contract curve ($45.50).  
Again to illustrate magnitudes, an agreement one diagonal unit from the contract 
curve would reduce joint earnings by $0.46 - $0.51 depending on where in the box it 
occurred, while an agreement two units away would cost $1.84-$2.03.  Failing to 
reach agreement, so that B would be imposed, would always cost the pair $16.73.  We 
find in Table 3 that the average joint earnings shortfall of agreements ranged from 
$0.07 to $1.28 in Round 1, narrowing to $0.00 to $0.29 by Round 5.  More formally, 
Table 4 reports p values from t tests that compare the joint earnings shortfall of 
agreements from the contract curve across treatments round by round.  We find that 
separating H from B (I vs. II, III vs. IV) had no significant effect on earnings shortfall 
in any round.  Separating E from N had no effect by Rounds 4 and 5 without historical 
divergence (I vs. III).  With historical divergence (II vs IV), separating E from N did 
significantly increase the mean joint earnings shortfall, but the magnitude of the 
difference was trivial.  The mean shortfall was $0.00 for Rounds 4 and 5 in Treatment 
2, and $0.07 and $0.03 in Treatment IV.  We interpret these results to suggest that, 
with limited experience, support for reaching agreement, and Pareto efficient 
agreements in particular, was strong across all four treatments.  With our three 
bargaining models’ common predictions out of the way, we turn now to look at the 




  25Table 4:  Cross Treatment Comparisons of Distance and Difference in Joint 
Earnings Between Agreements and the Contract Curve 
 
 
P Values From Between-Sample T Tests  
                                     Round 
                  1           2     3      4      5 
 
Distance to Contract Curve:   
 
I vs. II      (H=B→H≠B; N=E)  0.719
1  0.208 0.108 0.165    0.331 
III vs.IV        (H=B→H≠B; N≠E)             0.298  0.385  0.060  0.162  0.014
    
I vs. III          (N=E→N≠E; H=B)             0.112  0.001 0.000 0.319  0.011 
II vs. IV        (N=E→N≠E; H≠B)             0.725  0.880  0.518  0.004  0.021
  
 
Difference in Joint Earnings: 
 
I vs. II            (H=B→H≠B; N=E)             0.787  0.277  0.154  0.172  0.331 
III vs. IV       (H=B→H≠B; N≠E)             0.302  0.885  0.158  0.317  0.150 
 
I vs. III          (N=E→N≠E; H=B)             0.041 0.015  0.013  0.932  0.221  
II vs. IV        (N=E→N≠E; H≠B)             0.487   0.457  0.209  0.024  0.021 
 




4.2   Results Across the Four Treatments 
 
Table 5 reports a number of statistics concerning the deviations of the negotiated 
outcomes from the two points of greatest interest to us: the Nash bargain 
(13,13)/(7,7), and the efficient outcome that equalized payoffs in Treatments III and 
IV, (10,10)/(10,10).  Our first two measures report the geometric distances between 
our observed agreements and the two key allocations. As before, a one diagonal unit 
of deviation from an allocation of interest results in a distance of 1.41 units, and two 
results in 2.83 units. Our third measure in Table 5 provides a single measure of the 
pecuniary distance between observed agreements and the two key allocations.  This 
financial measure takes the absolute value of the difference between the 
environmentalist’s share  
  26Table 5:  Mean Distance and Deviation in Environmentalist’s Share of Earnings 
Between Agreements and the Allocations at (13,13)/(7,7) and (10,10)/(10,10) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Treatment                         Round  
                    1     2     3     4      5 
 
I  N=E=(13,13)/(7,7)    Distance to (13,13)    .84     0    0    .32    .12 
   H=B          St. dev.      1.28         0    0  1.00    .51 
 
               Distance to (10,10)  4.38  4.24  4.24  4.32  4.24 
               St. dev.          .39     0    0    .25    .03 
 
               Deviation in Env.’s          .29      .30   .30    .30    .30 
               Share of Earnings
1    .04     0    0    .02    .02 
 
 
II  N=E=(13,13)/(7,7)    Distance to (13,13)    .87    .63    .66     0     0  
    H≠B        St. dev.     1.30  1.88  1.63     0     0 
 
                Distance to (10,10)  4.13  4.44  4.58  4.24  4.24 
                St. dev.         .70  1.07    .81     0     0 
 
                Deviation in Env.’s    .25    .29    .29    .30    .30 
                Share of Earnings
1    .09    .05    .05      0      0 
     
 
III  N=(13,13)/(7,7),    Distance to (13,13)        3.02  2.43  2.42  2.06  2.08  
      E=(10,10)/(10,10)    St.  dev.      1.53 1.05 1.10 1.08     .91 
      H=B   
                Distance to (10,10)  1.44  2.30  2.35  2.63      2.72 
                St. dev.     1.47  1.17  1.26  1.34  1.26 
 
                Deviation in Env.’s  -.12  -.00    -.00    .05    .06 
                Share of Earnings
1   .22   .16    .18    .16    .15 
 
 
IV  N=(13,13)/(7,7),      Distance  to  (13,13)  4.13 3.59 3.13 3.34 3.52 
      E=(10,10)/(10,10)    St.  dev.      1.77 1.29 1.41 1.21 1.14 
      H≠B  
         Distance to (10,10)  1.27  1.20  1.30  1.09    .79 
                 St. dev.     2.28  1.55  1.53  1.47  1.18 
 
                 Deviation in Env.’s         -.23  -.17  -.13   -.16  -.20   
                 Share of Earnings
1   .15   .19   .21      .20    .16 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1  Ranges from -0.3, indicating the environmentalist’s share of earnings corresponds 
to that at the allocation (10,10) (10,10), to +0.3, corresponding to his share at (13,13) 
(7,7).  Standard deviation appears immediately below. 
  27of earnings at the agreement and what it would have been at (13,13)/(7,7), and 
subtracts from it the absolute value of the difference between the environmentalist’s 
share at the agreement and what it would have been at (10,10)/(10,10).  In all 
treatments this measure can range in value from -0.3, indicating that a pair settled 
exactly at (10,10)/(7,7), to +0.3, indicating that a pair settled exactly at the Nash 
allocation (13,13)/(7,7).  A measure of 0 indicates that the environmentalist’s share 
was half way between what it would have been at the two allocations.
15 
Treatment I 
As Table 5 illustrates, the agreements in Treatment I were at or very near N even in 
the first round.  This is true whether the measure is mean physical distance of 
agreements from N (0 by Round 2), or mean environmentalist’s share of earnings 
(+0.3 by Round 2).  Since the utilitarian, egalitarian and historical entitlement models 
all predict, or are consistent with, this outcome, Treatment I provides a reassuring 
baseline from which to make cross-treatment comparisons.   
Treatment II 
Recall that between Treatments I and II, the only change is that H diverges from the 
roughly equal distribution of initial income at B, ($14.67, $14.10), to a very unequal 
one in which the environmentalist starts with nothing ($0, $27.30).  Our results 
indicate that subjects ignored this unequal H and any bargaining lens it might have 
created.  As illustrated in Table 4, the agreements in Treatment II appear very similar 
to those in Treatment I, particularly from Round 2 on.   
                                                 
15  A simpler measure of pecuniary distance, such as comparing the difference in joint 
earnings at observed agreements from joint earnings at key allocations, was not 
feasible because joint earnings were identical at all such allocations along the contract 
curve. 
  28Treatment III 
Recall that in Treatment III the physical locations of H, B and N were all left 
unchanged from Treatment I; but the payoff functions were altered in such a way as to 
separate E from N. Thus, in this treatment, the payoffs were unequal at both N, 
($36.40, $9.10), and B, ($28.32, $0.45); while E -, (10,10)/(10,10) at ($22.75, $22.75) 
- lay outside the bargaining lens formed around B.  
As illustrated in Table 5, the agreements in Treatment III were more dispersed than 
previously, but were on average a compromise between E and N, both in physical 
distance and earnings share.  Agreements began slightly closer to E in Rounds 1 and 
2, and became slightly closer to N by Rounds 4 and 5. In Round 5, the modal 
agreement was at (11,11)/(9,9), generating earnings of ($27.30, $18.20). This 
outcome was just outside the bargaining lens, making the environmentalist $1.02 
worse off than by forgoing agreement.  However most agreements were closer than 
this to N, and were within the bargaining lens.       
Treatment IV 
Recall that the only change between Treatments III and IV was that H, in the latter, 
was separated from B, to an allocation that equalized initial payoffs at ($13.65, 
$13.65).  This value of H defined a “historical bargaining lens” that included the 
Pareto efficient allocation E (10,10)/(10,10), which as in Treatment III generated 
equal earnings of ($22.75, $22.75).  As illustrated in Table 5, the agreements in 
Treatment IV were again on average a compromise between E and N, but now far 
more heavily tilted towards E.  Agreements on average were physically closer to E 
than to N, and the Environmentalist’s share of earnings was closer to E than to N in all 
five rounds.  Indeed, the modal outcome was at (10,10)/(10,10) for all five rounds.  At 
this outcome, the environmentalists agreed to leave the bargaining lens defined by B, 
  29and earn $5.57 less than they could have by forgoing agreement.  This tendency 
remained as strong in Round 5 as in Round 1.  
 
4.3  The Three Way Horse Race 
With this summary of results, we are now in a position to compare the predictive 
power of the utilitarian, egalitarian and historical entitlement models of bargaining.  
Starting with utilitarianism, the Nash bargain remained at (13,13)/(7,7) in all four 
treatments, so that the distance or deviation in environmentalist’s share of earnings at 
agreements should not change as we introduce historical divergence (II vs. I, IV vs. 
III), or unequal Nash bargains (III vs. I, IV vs II).  Table 6 provides the p values of 
two tailed t tests comparing the mean distance and earnings share deviation of 
agreements from N and from (10,10)/(10,10) for the four relevant pair-wise 
comparisons, round by round.  Quite strikingly, the utilitarian approach failed to 
predict the significant movements away from N when E diverged from N between 
Treatments I and III, and Treatments II and IV.  There were significant differences in 
distance from N and earnings share in all five rounds for both treatment comparisons.  
And, although the utilitarian approach did successfully predict that separating H from 
B would have no significant effect on the distance of agreements from N when N=E, 
(that is, between Treatments I and II), it failed to predict the significant movement of 
agreements away from N when N≠E, (that is, between Treatments III and IV.) In the 
latter case, there were significant differences in distance from N and earnings share in 
Rounds 2, 4 and 5.  Thus, in our face-to-face, full information bargaining design, 
utilitarianism succeeded in its predictions in only one of four cross treatment 
comparisons. 
 
  30Table 6:  Cross Treatment Comparisons of Distance and Deviation in 
Environmentalist’s Share of Joint Earnings  
 
 
P Values From Between Sample T Tests  
                          Round 
                     1      2     3          4      5 
 
Distance to (13,13) (7,7): 
 
I vs. II    (H=B→H≠B;  N=E)    0.940
1  0.158   0.097  0.166  0.331 
III vs. IV   (H=B→H≠B; N≠E)    0.104  0.005   0.098  0.001  0.000
    
I vs. III    (N=E→N≠E; H=B)      0.001  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000 
II vs. IV    (N=E→N≠E; H≠B)     0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000
  
 
Distance to (10,10) (10,10): 
 
I vs. II    (H=B→H≠B; N=E)      0.200  0.431   0.085  0.163  0.331  
III vs. IV  (H=B→H≠B; N≠E)    0.827  0.021   0.030  0.001  0.000 
 
I vs. III   (N=E→N≠E; H=B)      0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000  0.000  
II vs. IV  (N=E→N≠E; H≠B)     0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000  0.000 
 
Deviation in Environmentalist’s Share: 
 
I vs. II    (H=B→H≠B;  N=E)      0.190 0.331 0.331 0.330    0.331 
III vs. IV  (H=B→H≠B; N≠E)    0.199  0.008 0.063 0.001  0.000
    
I vs. III   (N=E→N≠E; H=B)      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    0.000 








  In contrast, the egalitarian hypothesis alone successfully predicted most of the 
cross treatment effects.  Like utilitarianism, it correctly predicted no difference in 
agreement outcomes between Treatments I and II, since E remained at N.  Unlike the 
utilitarian approach, however, it correctly predicted that agreements would move 
away from (13,13)/(7,7) towards (10,10)/(10,10) between Treatments I and III, and 
between Treatments II and IV.  These movements, whether measured in physical or 
  31earnings share deviations, were significantly different at the 5% level or better for all 
five rounds in between-sample t tests.  The only flaw in the predictive success of the 
egalitarian approach concerned the comparison of agreements in Treatment III and 
IV, where H diverged from B.  Since E (and B and N) remained unchanged between 
these treatments, the egalitarian prediction was that agreements would remain 
unchanged.  Yet between-sample t tests find that agreements moved significantly 
further away from N and towards E in both distance and earnings share deviation in 
Rounds 2, 4 and 5.  The fact that the allocation (10,10)/(10,10) became not only equal 
but an allocation on the contract curve within the bargaining lens defined by H 
significantly increased the support it received.  The egalitarian approach alone cannot 
explain this.  In short, egalitarianism succeeded in its predictions in three of four cross 
treatment comparisons.       
  Finally, the historical entitlement hypothesis alone failed to predict most of the 
cross treatment effects.  It successfully predicted that a divergence of an equal H from 
a very unequal B (and resulting N) between Treatments III and IV would significantly 
pull agreements further away from N towards the E allocation in Rounds 2, 4 and 5.  
While the E allocation (10,10)/(10,10) equalized efficient earnings in both III and IV, 
it was in IV alone that it lay on the contract curve within the bargaining lens defined 
by H.  In all other cross treatment comparisons, however, historical entitlement’s 
predictions were not born out.  Agreements did not change in distance or earnings 
deviation from N or E between Treatments I and II when H diverged from B for any 
round.  Conversely, agreements did change significantly in distance or earnings 
deviations from N and E between Treatments I and III and between Treatments II and 
IV, when the location of H was constant.  In short, historical entitlement alone joined 
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comparisons. 
  
5 Discussion  and  Conclusion 
Many public policy debates can be characterized as disputes among multiple interest 
groups over policies that are composed of multiple attributes. In this paper, we 
analyze one method of resolving these disputes that has been widely discussed by 
non-economists: collaborative decision-making. Specifically, we use laboratory 
experiments to determine whether competing groups would be able to reach 
agreement under this approach and, if so, to test two factors that might affect the 
nature of those agreements.   
  Subjects in our experiments were provided with induced payoff functions over 
combinations of two goods; and were asked to negotiate trades among those 
combinations, subject to the condition that if they failed to reach an agreement, a 
backstop outcome would be imposed.  Our subjects were faced with a much more 
complex set of problems than had been posed in previous bargaining experiments – 
they could trade up to twenty units of each of two items, with approximately two 
hundred possible payoff outcomes.  It was thus a reassuring finding that our subjects 
were quickly able to negotiate Pareto efficient (or nearly Pareto efficient) agreements, 
even when the payoffs imposed at the backstop allocation were very unequal ($28.32, 
$0.45) or differed substantially from the payoffs at the initial (historical) allocation.  
By the final round of negotiations, agreement rates were never less than 95%, and 
never achieved less than 99% of the total payoffs available on the contract curve.   
  Admittedly, the fact that there were no transactions costs to negotiations, full 
information as to opponents’ payoffs, and face-to-face unrestricted communication 
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encouraging with respect to the ability of collaborative bargaining to achieve Pareto 
efficient agreements relative to backstop policies that governments set, even in very 
“unfair” conditions.    
  The second result found in our implementation was that the utilitarian Nash 
bargain alone was a poor guide to the specific Pareto efficient allocation parties would 
select when it resulted in unequal payoffs.  By the final round of negotiations, 95 to 
100 percent of our subjects chose the Nash bargain when it equalized payoffs, but 
only 0 to 5 percent did so when it yielded unequal payoffs. 
  In contrast, we found that egalitarian principles provided an excellent, though 
imperfect, guide to the efficient allocations that our parties selected. When the 
efficient outcome that offered equal payoffs to our parties differed from the Nash 
bargain, their agreements were drawn away from the latter towards the former. This 
movement was reinforced when the historical allocation of resources (that is, the 
status quo) was also separated from the backstop in the same direction as the equal 
payoff allocation was separated from the Nash bargain. In this latter case, by the fifth 
round of bargaining 60 percent of subjects (12/20) chose the efficient outcome that 
equalized payoffs, whereas only 5 percent (1/20) chose the Nash bargain. It appears 
that bargainers were drawn to a compromise between the utilitarian and egalitarian 
outcomes when these diverged; but that the extent of this compromise was affected by 
the parties’ historical entitlement. Egalitarianism alone would not have predicted this 
finding. 
  Finally, the effect of historical entitlements on outcomes was decidedly 
asymmetric. In our first two treatments, in which the Nash bargain offered equal 
payoffs to the parties, the separation of the historical allocation from the backstop had 
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pointed bargainers towards more unequal efficient agreements was ignored.  In 
contrast, in our second two treatments, in which the egalitarian outcome diverged 
from the Nash bargain, a historical allocation that pointed bargainers towards more 
equal agreements was decidedly influential.  It appears that the entitlement effect was 
too weak to draw parties away from a Nash bargain that equalized payoffs; but strong 
enough to draw parties further away from a Nash bargain that did not equalize 
payoffs.  Of course, one could argue that it is impressive that historical entitlement 
had even this asymmetric effect considering the weakness of its implementation in our 
design: initial bargainer types and their associated endowments were assigned 
randomly and subjects were not told they were “deserved.” 
   In future work, it would be interesting to see whether collaborative bargaining 
would be as successful in achieving Pareto efficient agreements, and egalitarian 
agreements in particular, if information about payoffs was private rather than public, 
and if unequal starting or backstop allocations were earned rather than randomly 
assigned.  Other experiments in bargaining have found that private information about 
payoffs can strengthen support for utilitarian predictions at the expense of egalitarian 
ones (Roth and Malouf, 1979, Roth, Malouf, and Murninghan, 1981, Hoffman and 
Spitzer, 1986, and Rhoads and Shogren, 2003).  It has similarly been found that 
assigning bargainer roles by contest rather than randomly similarly strengthens 
support for utilitarian rather than egalitarian outcomes (see for example, Davis and 
Holt (1993:  265-267), Hoffman et al. (1994) and Oxoby and Spraggon (2008)).  The 
effect of these design changes on the relative support for historical entitlement 
predictions remains an open question.             
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